The very idea of strategic thinking is quite opposed to the tradition of linking the choices of agents, individual or collective, to the process of maximization under constraints. The theory of general equilibrium has closed the door to the notion of strategy, just as the theory of generalized free trade has closed that of sovereignty. But this paradigm is falling apart. With a new approach of radical uncertainty, something made even more obvious with the COVID-19 pandemic, we are relearning the science and art of strategy, the more so because we are living in a world of a balance of power. But what would be the definition of strategy? Quite clearly we must distinguish between state and company strategy. This debate is also at the very center of the controversy over the role and meaning of institutions in economics. There is also a variety of strategies and those having a distinct appetite for risk must seriously consider whether to practice the art of strategy or not.
Strategy, strategic thinking, uncertainty, risk, procedural rationality, individual preferences, information, knowledge
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